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Elephants as persons, affective 
apprenticeship, and fieldwork 
with nonhuman informants 
in Nepal
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In this account of interspecies intimacy in the enclaved institution of the Nepali 
elephant stable, I explore not-just-human figurations of personhood and argue for the 
methodological inclusion of nonhuman informants as subjective actors and contributing 
participants in ethnographic research. I explain how my experience forming a trusting, 
working relationship with a female elephant in a hybrid community of humans and 
elephants revealed the conceptual limitations of a human-focused tradition of ethnography 
ill-equipped for the generative sociality of interspecies encounters. I discuss questions of 
nonhuman personhood and I consider developments in the animal behavioral sciences, 
while also investigating the cultural logic by which Nepali mahouts attribute personhood 
to their elephants. This exploration of apprenticeship, personhood, and affective encounter 
is situated in a distinctly interspecies strand of multispecies studies, and is a contribution to 
ethnoelephantology as an interdisciplinary approach to the social, historical, and ecological 
relations between humans and elephants.
Keywords: apprenticeship learning, human-elephant relations, nonhuman personhood, 
multispecies studies, ethnoelephantology, mahouts, Nepal
It is 5 a.m. and as I open the door of my hut I see Sitasma Kali and Kha Prasad silhou-
etted in the wintry mist. Mother and baby are waiting as usual, tethered to their post, 
ready for the first duty of the day: grass cutting. Barefoot, armed with a stick and a 
sickle, and carrying a sack to sit on, I approach my elephant companion. As usual, she 
extends her trunk, curling it around me for an olfactory probing in what has become 
a communicative ritual of loving trust. Her warm breath caresses my skin as my hand 
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strokes the delightful grooves of her many-muscled trunk. She is the only elephant I 
submit myself to in this way. Another could easily respond with violent animosity.
I give the command “baith!” and Sitasma descends delicately, crouching on her 
knees. I remove the sikri (tethering chain) that connects her right foot to the kambha 
(post), and put a kasni (neck chain) around her large, wrinkled neck. I use the sack to 
gently beat the dust off her, and then I make the gesture of supplication that connects 
my head and my heart to her divine body. Now I am ready to mount her. I am sitting 
on a sack on her neck, positioned between the hairy crown of her head and her bony 
shoulders. I insert my feet into the atargal (braided stirrups) that connect to the kasni. 
Now I am ready to apply my toes to the soft skin behind her ears, establishing a kin-
esthetic union of human and elephant. I shout “maiel!” Sitasma stands, and I depress 
my toes to communicate a request to move forward. Accompanied by her infant son 
Kha, we plod off toward the river, beyond which lie the grasslands where we will cut 
fodder for the day.
***
The human-elephant relationship intimated here is not just a peak experience 
from the ethnographic odyssey of an anthropologist in a culturally foreign space. 
It also represents a privileged form of intimate, interspecies relations rarely sub-
ject to ethnographic inquiry. By thinking about human-elephant relations in terms 
of intersubjective interactions, considering elephants as persons or near-persons 
with whom one produces social relations, my ethnography raises questions about 
human exceptionalism in ethnographic methodology. This exceptionalism is evi-
dent in humanist scholarship that suggests humans alone can be disregarded from 
the webs of interspecies dependency by which we understand other life (Haraway 
2008: 11). Posthumanist critiques of the ways in which humanity has been concep-
tually segregated from other life forms are relevant here (Castree et al. 2004), as 
are the biocultural sciences of sentient and socially complex mammals that suggest 
culture, in the qualified sense of socially acquired and transmitted knowledge and 
behavior, is not unique to humans (Byrne et al. 2004).
These challenges to the conceptual binary of the cultural human and the natural 
animal inform many ethnographies of shared life that are emerging in response to 
both the ontological insularity of humanism and the ecological de-contextualiza-
tion that it encourages (Latour 1998: 16). Unlike previous work in the socio-cultur-
al anthropology of human-animal relations (see Mullin 1999), this work seeks to 
overcome the compartmentalizing limitations of the “two cultures” of the sciences 
and the humanities by attending to disciplinary knowledge from both domains. 
This posthumanist “multispecies turn” also exceeds an exclusively zoological con-
cern, recognizing that even primarily dyadic interactions between human and 
nonhuman animals involve other kinds of living agents, as Celia Lowe and Ursula 
Münster (2016) demonstrate with regard to humans, elephants, and the herpes vi-
rus, for instance.
Applying insights from the sciences and the humanities, theorists have been ar-
guing that not only humans engage in semiosis (Kohn 2013), that not only humans 
exercise meaningful agency (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010), that we should recog-
nize that human life is constituted not in opposition to but through relations with 
animal others (Lestel and Taylor 2013: 183), that humans construct their social and 
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ecological niches in consort with companion species (Fuentes and Kohn 2012), and 
therefore that there can and should be an “anthropology beyond humanity” (Ingold 
2013). These are just a few key assertions from a more-than-human approach gain-
ing traction in the humanities and social sciences, perhaps most evident in anthro-
pology, geography, and science and technology studies (Locke and Münster 2015). 
Indeed, the concerns and perspectives shared by such discipline-specific develop-
ments as “multispecies ethnography” (Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Ogden, Hall, 
and Tanita 2013), “more-than-human geography” (Whatmore 2006; Panelli 2010), 
and even “transspecies history” (Nance 2013; Baker 2016) warrant recognition of 
a more inclusive discursive space. This has now been advanced with the proposal 
for “multispecies studies” recenty made by Thom van Dooren, Eben Kirksey, and 
Ursula Münster (2016). The authors argue that we should “cultivate arts of atten-
tiveness” by embracing a range of approaches for knowing and understanding oth-
ers, by unsettling given notions, by considering modes of classifying and categoriz-
ing, and by considering the ways in which forms of life constitute worlds in consort, 
an agenda that informs the concerns of this article.
Informed by a conceptual tool kit that emphasizes mutuality, becoming, and 
entanglement, multispecies studies represents a site for a diverse array of work that 
helps to reframe knowledge and redirect understanding through explorations of 
multispecies networks and interspecies interactions. Anna Tsing and colleagues, 
for instance, collaboratively elucidate the connections between humans, pine for-
ests, and matsutake mushrooms in economic and ecological processes involving 
knowledge, livelihood, and commodification at multiple sites (e.g., Choy et al. 
2009; Tsing 2015). Marcus Baynes-Rock, by contrast, explores a particular dyadic 
relation between humans and hyenas at the singular site of Harar, Ethiopia, where 
these bone-eating scavengers uniquely share urban space with human city dwellers 
(2015). These cases, the first focusing on multiple, networked agency, the second 
on intimate interspecies relations, indicate the divergent possibilities of multispe-
cies studies in terms of scope, focus, and method, while sharing a concern with the 
ways in which humans advance their projects and make their worlds with nonhu-
man others that are conceived as more than merely passive biotic and semiotic 
matter. Perhaps the crucial distinction here is between the presence or absence of 
interactive subjectivities, at least as our zoocentric perspective inclines us to rec-
ognize. Indeed, it is now possible to recognize a particular strand of multispecies 
studies that focuses on interspecies intimacies, often through productive engage-
ments with the animal behavioral sciences (for a literature review of multispecies 
ethnography, its allied approaches, its particular trajectories, and formative theo-
retical resources, see Locke and Münster 2015).
This article pursues this focus on specifically interspecies ethnography, and ar-
gues that we need to reconsider the cross-species continuities between humans 
and similarly sentient companion species while also considering how their lives 
have been jointly configured through their social, historical, and ecological inter-
sections (Locke 2013, 2016a). It does so by attending to the affective aspects of an 
ethnographic apprenticeship as a mahout in the government stables of the Chitwan 
National Park, Nepal, an occasionally dangerous form of skilled custodial labor. 
Through focus on empathetic and embodied engagement with an elephant (hatti 
in Nepali) named Sitasma Kali, it concerns life in a community of humans and 
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elephants so morally and practically entangled that it may be described as hybrid 
(Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006). It also considers the multiple, malleable, and 
culturally variable character of ideas about personhood, not always restricted to 
anthropic figurations. In so doing, I acknowledge that conceptions of personhood 
rooted in Western thought are deployed by the animal sciences to make moral and 
legal arguments for nonhuman personhood, that local understanding produces a 
figuration of personhood based on a logic of permeability between animals, per-
sons, and gods, while also interrogating my intersubjective experience apprenticing 
as a mahout. I therefore explain how I was compelled to reconceive my research as 
an ethnographic study with two types of person—only one of which is human—by 
presenting an experiential account of a relationship forged across species bound-
aries. This represents a methodological disruption to the typically humanist con-
straints of ethnography, in that elephants not only came to represent subjective 
actors but also participating research informants.
The site for this interspecies relationship is the enclaved institution of the gov-
ernment elephant stable or sarkari hattisar, a regimented space where human and 
elephant lives are bound together in service to the imperatives of protected area 
management (Locke 2011a). The human occupational community that constitutes 
this institution draws on a long history in Nepal of capturing and managing el-
ephants for trade, tribute, hunting, and ceremony (Locke 2011b). Physically en-
closed and socially segregated, and with its own distinctive Hindu ritual practices, 
the hattisar represents a total institution since virtually all aspects of life are con-
ducted together, under a single authority and according to a systematic schedule, 
deriving from a rational plan (Goffman 1961). However, comprising a hybrid oc-
cupational community of humans and elephants, whose handlers variously treat 
elephants as animals, as persons, and as gods, this may be better conceived as a 
multispecies total institution (Locke 2011a, 2013, 2016b). The particular hattisar 
at which I apprenticed—with the original objective of documenting the skilled 
practice and expert knowledge of a human occupational community—was the 
Khorsor Elephant Breeding Center. At this stable, pregnant females are brought 
to give birth, and their offspring are trained for working life in the National Parks 
and protected areas of Nepal’s lowland Tarai (see the documentary film “Servants 
of Ganesh,” Dugas and Locke 2010). This enables the government, as a signatory to 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), to main-
tain its population of working elephants now that it is no longer able to legally 
purchase elephants across national borders.
It is from this location among a community of breeding elephants and their 
handlers that I explore ideas of nonhuman personhood in relation to fieldwork 
experience, locally configured understandings, and the cognitive and behavioral 
animal sciences, three different but intersecting sites for figuring the significance 
of the subjective agency of elephants. This exploration of human-elephant com-
panionship is also conceptually situated in relation to ethnoelephantology, an 
emerging framework for understanding multiple aspects of the human-elephant 
nexus through time and across space (Locke 2013). Inspired by ethnoprimatol-
ogy, the interdisciplinary study of human-primate interactions (Fuentes 2010, 
2012), it argues for recognition of the shared subjective agency of human and el-
ephant, the generative sociality of their imbricated lives and landscapes, and the 
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applicability of methodological perspectives from the social and natural sciences 
to better understand this kind of interspecies intersection (Locke 2013; Locke and 
Buckingham 2016). This partly involves recognition of the common concerns and 
practices of ethology and ethnography as ultimately similar forms of social and 
environmental research (Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006; Lestel, Bussolini, and 
Chrulew 2014), and hence an attempt to integrate multiple forms of disciplinary 
knowledge.
Empathy, experience, and apprenticeship
Ethnoelephantology also represents an attempt at theorizing an integrated frame-
work for investigating the myriad interconnections that bind humans to free roam-
ing, captive, and symbolic elephants through enterprises of power, wealth, worship, 
pleasure, and preservation. The use of the “ethno-” prefix then refers not to the 
constructed understandings of particular human groups, as with ethnobiology and 
its cognates, but to the consideration of anthropogenic influences that configure 
the ecological, physiological, and social aspects of nonhuman life (Fuentes 2010: 
601). This approach to human-elephant relations contributes then to an interspe-
cies strand of multispecies studies as an attempt at articulating “more-than-human” 
and sometimes also “not-just-animal” approaches to shared life. This work chal-
lenges the ontological binaries of humanism, with its polarities of nature and cul-
ture, human and animal, subject and object, that have served to sequester humanity 
in what many posthumanist and multispecies thinkers consider an epistemologi-
cally impoverished space of ecological segregation. However, it is crucial to appre-
ciate that my personal, in situ conviction regarding nonhuman personhood that I 
discuss here preceded anthropological theorization, the emergence of multispecies 
ethnography, and my familiarity with posthumanist thinking, arising instead from 
the transformative intensity of fieldwork with more than one social species capable 
of expressing intentional agency and interspecies empathy.
In my experience of participant observation the sarkari hattisar elephants as 
well as humans came to fulfill the role of informant, leading me to question the 
Western idea that implicitly equates humanity with personhood. In Western mo-
dernity, the latter has been considered an exclusive attribute of the former as self-
knowing, self-directing agents in social worlds (Taylor 1985). This had the effect of 
precluding the possibility of nonhuman individuals as decisive agents. Indeed, we 
can locate this Western conception of personhood in Enlightenment social contract 
theory, from which developed legal theories of moral responsibility concerned with 
the capacities by which individuals make informed decisions about the conditions 
of their existence (Collier, Maurer, and Suárez-Navaz 1997). At this time, too, I 
was unaware of the extent to which the animal behavioral and cognitive sciences 
blur the boundaries implied by this exceptionalist view, confirming elephants also 
as self-conscious, intentional, and social beings (Poole and Moss 2008). Philoso-
pher Gary Varner, for instance, reviews evidence for autonoetic consciousness in 
elephants (which basically refers to a reflexive awareness of one’s own life in the 
past, present, and future), which he uses as a proxy with which to infer and argue 
for the personhood of elephants (2008). Indeed, these criteria of self-consciousness 
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from the animal sciences converge with these legal traditions of the sovereign indi-
vidual in arguments for nonhuman personhood made by ethical theorists (Mitchell 
1993). Such arguments are increasingly coming to court in order to secure legal 
rights for nonhuman animals, although they raise further questions for humans as 
the moral agents granting the status of personhood (Riddle 2014).
It is crucial, however, that in questioning the parameters of personhood, I did 
so without concern for authoritative legal judgment or scientific opinion, and that 
I did so through my ethnographic willingness to surrender my being and open my-
self to new modes of experience (Benedict 1948 in Rubenstein 2004: 1048). Indeed, 
Heidegger’s notion of being-in-the-world depends on the claim that our practi-
cal involvement with a world that cannot be separated from the perceiving self 
comes prior to the actions of a cogitating ego (Willerslev 2007: 21). Only later did 
I focus my attention on local logics of personhood, and furnish my direct experi-
ence of engaging with elephants as persons with theoretical justifications. It was the 
primacy of experience that enabled me to initiate a process of mutual becoming 
(Haraway 2008) through which Sitasma and I attuned our bodies and our selves, 
only possible because I was granted the privilege of apprenticing as a mahout, or 
hattisare as they are known in Chitwan.
From the outset, my hosts expressed the conviction that I could never truly un-
derstand their working life unless I too became a hattisare. This not only coincided 
with my methodological convictions about fieldwork as a form of apprenticeship, 
and the limitations of verbal exposition in learning and acculturation (Bloch 1991: 
194; Ingold 1993: 222), but also with my personal hopes for a project inspired by 
Mark Shand’s account of the relationship he developed with an elephant named 
Tara that he rode across India (Shand 1991). However, I had to wait for access to 
the participatory experience that would admit me to the exclusive world of the hat-
tisare. When the adikrit subba, the chief mahout, designated me to apprentice with 
Sitasma Kali, a 20-year-old female of good temperament who was always accom-
panied by her two-year-old son, Kha Prasad, I experienced a moment of ecstatic 
joy and excited anticipation. Sporting a finely waxed moustache and exuding con-
fident authority, the adikrit subba, whom we all respectfully addressed as “section 
sahib” (since he is chief of the government’s elephant section), granted me permis-
sion like any other edict a commanding officer might issue. Rather than merely 
tolerated, I now felt my presence in the hattisar was accepted, by the humans if not 
yet by the elephants.
I understood his authorization as an endorsement of the experiential aspirations 
I held for my research, realizing that with this momentous decision he had consoli-
dated his position as patron of my research. No longer just a foreign researcher, 
I had now been admitted to the ranks as a novice handler, an honorary mahut, 
obliged to diligently participate in the corporeal practices of elephant care, and to 
obey the members of Sitasma’s care team. This comprised Dipendra, her mahut, 
the lowest rank primarily responsible for keeping an elephant’s stable space clean; 
Tej Narayan, her patchuwa or grass-cutter; and Ram Ekval, her phanet or driver/
trainer, as well as Ram Lotan, the phanet for Kha, who would have the responsibil-
ity of accompanying him through the transformative initiation of training when he 
reached the age of three. With my new status as something of a “privileged idiot,” 
I was able to engage in the daily routines and interspecies encounters of life in the 
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hattisar, to experience otherwise unobtainable camaraderie, and most crucially, to 
develop my own physical and emotional relationship with an elephant.
The exertions of hattisare labor in the stable, in the forests, grasslands, and riv-
ers as well as on elephant back, not only enabled me to appreciate the rigors of 
the elephant handling profession but also to attempt to master new skills, includ-
ing the sensual, embodied communication with nonhuman companions that only 
develops through sustained interaction between human and elephant selves. Few 
dispensations were made just because I was the foreign researcher. Thus, from the 
outset I had to ride Sitasma bareback; there would be no gada for me (a padded 
cushion made of sackcloth filled with dried grass) and certainly no hauda (a balus-
traded seat secured on top of a gada to provide passengers a safe and comfortable 
ride). Riding astride Sitasma’s bony spine as she ambled along jungle trails and 
forded rivers was at first far from comfortable (better when loaded with bundles of 
cut grass), but it did allow me to learn the feel of her moving body and adapt my 
comportment to it. Indeed, the acquisition of a mutually attuned bodily proficiency 
represented one of the most crucial and foundational aspects of my apprenticeship 
with Sitasma. Later I would theorize this empathetic and embodied apprenticeship 
by drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the body-schema (1962), Pierre 
Bourdieu’s idea of the habitus as a system of acquired dispositions (1977, 1990; 
Acciaioli 1981; Crossley 2001), and Thorstein Gieser’s argument for the role of em-
pathy in apprenticeship learning (2008).
My forays into the forests on elephant back represented more than just par-
ticipation in authentic forms of hattisare practice: it was also about the sensual-
ity of touch in communicating with, caring for, and being cared for by Sitasma. 
When I sat in the more comfortable and more intimate driving position, her warm 
ears flapping on my bare legs, I would be drawn to the alluring divot between the 
hemispheres of her gently bobbing head. I would stroke the curiously coarse hairs 
there, and I would enjoy the warm breath from her occasionally probing trunk 
that seemed to signify affection. I also demonstrated attentive care by swatting the 
flies whose bites draw blood (elephants, as I learned, are not thick-skinned as com-
monly asserted, and as suggested by the obsolete taxonomic order pachydermata). 
In so doing, I appreciated that she was sacrificing the opportunity to cover herself 
with protective soil by carrying a rider. If I dropped my stick (kocha), which I car-
ried to discipline her should the need arise (the ankus, or spiked hook is not used 
by Nepali hattisare), she would pick it up and hand it to me with her trunk. Such 
were the visceral delights and habits of affectionate care that characterized our kin-
esthetic union.
Vinciane Despret’s examination of how scientists use their bodies when engag-
ing the animals they observe is helpful here (2013). Discussing a range of cases, 
including the primatological fieldwork of Barbara Smuts and Shirley Strum among 
baboons, she argues that forms of embodied communication are crucial for es-
tablishing empathetic relations, which in turn are crucial for the understandings 
ethologists develop. Despret develops the notion of “embodied empathy,” which 
is particularly useful for thinking about the affective relations I consider between 
Sitasma and me. Of course, for much of the twentieth century, techniques of “em-
bodied empathy” were downplayed in the accounts of animal ethologists, since that 
would imply reciprocal interactions at variance with the purely observational ethos 
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of the discipline. As Despret notes, these were transgressions for which Strum and 
Smuts attracted harsh critique, since they adopted the stance of an ethnographer as 
Strum herself admits, allowing themselves to be educated by their subjects through 
embodied interactions, just as I did as an anthropologist with Sitasma (albeit in a 
rather more tactile way, and in a context of shared dwelling with elephant individu-
als already acculturated to humans).
Even if it was not widely accepted at first, these primatologists’ attempts to use 
their own bodies in order to participate with their subjects, particularly regard-
ing learning and mimicking baboon body language, were not without precedent. 
For instance, Konrad Lorenz, a foundational figure in ethology, famously allowed 
geese and jackdaws to imprint on him. Precedent can similarly be found for the 
attempts of Smuts and Strum to make sense of animal perspectives rather than just 
behavior, as the “phenomenological biology” of Jakob von Uexküll testifies. Most 
significant is his umwelt theory of the perceptual worlds of meaningful dwell-
ing that species construct and inhabit by virtue of the sensory apparatus, bodily 
capacities, and environmental affordances particular to them in their habitats 
(see von Uexküll 1957).
All of this has significant implications for multispecies ethnography, ethnoele-
phantology, and my interspecies apprenticeship. The case of Smuts and Strum in-
dicates a blurring of the disciplinary practices of ethnography and ethology, the 
productive possibilities of which are explored by Dominique Lestel and his col-
leagues (Lestel, Brunois, and Gaunet 2006). More recently, Lestel and colleagues 
argue, rather provocatively, that ethology ought to be incorporated into the social 
sciences, or at least a version no longer exclusive to humans (Lestel, Bussolini, and 
Chrulew 2014). Setting aside this bold proposal of appropriation and disciplin-
ary reconfiguration, this work helps establish a mandate for no longer restricting 
ethnography to human life, especially important for those works of multispecies 
ethnography that focus on intersubjective relations, and that seek to integrate tra-
ditionally divergent forms of disciplinary expertise. For myself, of course, I only 
belatedly realized the need to attend more closely to expertise concerning a species 
my anthropological training had not prepared me for. This contrasts with Baynes-
Rock’s work on humans and hyenas in Harar (2013, 2015), which was simultane-
ously informed by animal ethology and human ethnography from the outset. In 
addition to Lestel’s arguments regarding “etho-ethnology” and “ethno-ethology” 
(2006), aspects of von Uexküll’s approach seem similarly significant, resonating 
in the multispecies work of anthropologists like Eduardo Kohn, concerned with 
more-than-human semiosis in ecological systems (2013), and Tim Ingold, con-
cerned with the perceptual interpenetrations and behavioral adjustments of shared 
dwelling, demonstrated with regard to humans and reindeer (2013).
Returning to my companionship with Sitasma, our intimate interactions re-
vealed to me personal recognition, intentionality, playfulness, attentive concern, 
and an ability to convey preferences and desires. As I would learn, these are con-
stituents of what animal behavioral scientists identify as empathic consciousness 
(Bates et al. 2008). And following Despret’s argument, it was by virtue of the em-
bodied relationship that developed between us that I was alerted to this. As a re-
sult of our tactile communication and the trusting bond it produced, even before 
investigating the discursive genealogy of Western personhood and the possibility 
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of its extension beyond the human, I experienced Sitasma not just as an individual 
but also as a person, at least in operational terms. In this sense, I did so in a prethe-
orized way since my direct, affective experience was produced by immersion in 
joint, intersubjective action (see Ingold 1992). What had been originally conceived 
as an ethnographic study of human expertise in captive animal management could 
no longer be sustained in such constraining terms. An ethological impulse to at-
tend to animal behavior intruded upon my research project, as did an urge to eth-
nographically incorporate my relationship with a nonhuman companion. Sitasma 
and the other elephants had not only become subjective actors but also informing 
participants with whom I developed the social relations necessary for communica-
tive understanding. This challenged the humanist basis of ethnography that makes 
it ontologically ill equipped to treat nonhuman beings as ultimately anything but 
animate objects.
Reverence, gift-giving, and identity
Nutritional gifts for elephants were another aspect of my affective apprenticeship 
that warrants attention. Not only relevant to building rapport with and facilitat-
ing obedience from Sitasma, these gifts also provide insight into the reverential 
attitudes that inflect human relations with elephants in the hattisar. Every day we 
would make dana with the grass we had cut and transported from the interior of 
the National Park. These are bite-sized grass packages filled with unhusked rice, 
salt, and molasses. In the interests of nutritional prudence and a ritual acknowl-
edgment of elephant divinity however, the salt and molasses would be left out on 
Tuesdays, the day of Mars, the planet associated with the elephant-headed god 
Ganesh, while at the nearby Sauraha hattisar these ingredients were also left out 
on Sundays, when posts commemorating dead elephants were ritually venerated. 
These packages represent a crucial part of the elephants’ supplementary diet, which 
help mitigate the time captive elephants spend working rather than grazing, as they 
would in their free roaming state. However, they are also important as an item of 
exchange with which a handler mediates his relationship with his elephant. My ini-
tially clumsy attempts at making dana provoked laughter from my new human col-
leagues. I felt duty bound to invest my effort in perfecting their production though, 
since Ram Ekval, the phanet and chief of Sitasma’s care team made it clear that these 
nutritional packages would be crucial for me to foster an effective relationship with 
Sitasma.
In India these grass packages are commonly called kuchi, but it is highly signifi-
cant that in Nepal they are called dana. Although dana means gift, it is different 
from a merely mundane gift or upavar. Rather, dana denotes a religious offering. 
This became acutely meaningful to me when a phanet named Satya Narayan made 
the following statement of apology during the training of a juvenile elephant called 
Paras Gaj: “We ride you as an inferior servant, but we know that you are a superior 
god” (Dugas and Locke 2010). It is understood that every elephant is imbued with 
the divine substance of Ganesh, a theriomorphic deity represented as a four-armed 
being with an elephant head. Combining the anthropoid with the elephantine, for 
hattisare the symbol of Ganesh might be seen to reflect the parallel and paradoxical 
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identities of devotee and god, servant and master in relations between handlers and 
elephants.
Thus, the giving of dana as a “meal” in the afternoon after daytime grazing, and 
at other times as a “snack” to secure cooperation, should not merely be seen instru-
mentally as a “bribe” but also as an act of reverence for acknowledging the divinity 
inherent within the elephant, while also signifying your commitment to the com-
panion upon whom your livelihood depends. Rather than representing an ideology 
that mystifies a purely transactional relationship, I found the meaning of dana for 
handlers was indicative of a relationship that binds human and elephant together 
in a condition of reciprocal mutuality. This gift is most certainly not the tainted 
“Indian gift” that transfers the sins of the giver, the gift that pays for ritual services 
(Parry 1986; Raheja 1988). Instead, this is the sacrificial gift presented to the gods, 
who are immune to the transfer of impurity. This gift literally and symbolically 
feeds one of their living embodiments, a contrast to typical Hindu worship (puja) 
in which digestible gifts are presented to images of gods (devako murti), and then 
consumed as consecrated leftovers (prasad) (Fuller 1979).
Hattisare do not merely receive loyalty and obedience in exchange for prepar-
ing and giving dana (the production of which also depends on the elephant’s labor 
in collecting the grass for their production); it is also one of many practices that 
engenders a loving commitment, part of that process of mutual becoming to which 
I earlier referred. A young mahut named Birendra explained: “Being without your 
elephant would be like chopping off your hand—it’s because of our elephants that 
we can survive, and that’s why we must love them.” Birendra may be acknowledging 
his material dependence on his elephant for his livelihood, but he is also acknowl-
edging how integral that relationship is to his social identity as a hattisare, and 
reciprocally, how important it is to discharge his duty to his elephant. The captive 
elephant is thus revealed as an icon of both livelihood and occupational identity, for 
which hattisare avoid distinguishing the sentimental from the instrumental.
Autonomy, consciousness, and mutuality
The profound mutuality of this interspecies relationship became increasingly evi-
dent as I learned other core duties of elephant care, the most important of which 
are taking your elephant to graze and to bathe. After early morning grass cutting, 
and the preparation of dana, hattisare would take the first of their two daily meals 
of rice and lentils (dal bhat). Then it would be time to head out into the forests, 
savannas, and rivers of the park in the heat of the day, returning mid-afternoon. 
During grazing we usually chose to team up with other elephant-handler teams, de-
termined by intersecting networks of interpersonal relationships among elephants 
and among handlers. This was the primary situation for Sitasma and me to develop 
and sustain the embodied empathy of our interspecies relationship.
As in the vignette with which I began this article, upon mounting my elephant 
companion, I would reverentially touch Sitasma’s flank with the first two fingers of 
my right hand before touching my forehead and my chest (signifying the heart), just 
as when one anoints oneself with tika powder as prasad (the consecrated leftovers 
from performing a devotional act of sacrificial worship). Ram Ekval explained to 
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me that this was the hattisare way of acknowledging our elephant’s divinity, and 
requesting the goodwill of Ganesh while riding his incarnation. Upon reflection, 
I came to realize that acts like these were not merely an aspect of the etiquette of 
human-elephant relations—they were also an implicit recognition of the elephant’s 
autonomy, of their being-in-the-world, their capability to make their own decisions 
rather than just follow our commands.
Just as no interpersonal relationship among humans can be truly considered 
unconditional, so it is between elephants and mahouts. The elephant’s commit-
ment is conditional, but not just according to conventional understandings of 
Pavlovian positive reinforcement and other approaches to the behavioral processes 
and economic utilities of animal learning theory (Schultz 2006). There is more 
at stake than the fulfillment of an elephant’s needs and appetites in exchange for 
obedience and cooperation. Such a purely instrumental view would only perpetu-
ate the human exceptionalism arising from the human/animal dualism that has 
animated both humanist scholarship and the animal sciences. In such models of 
domination there is little conceptual space to accommodate the dynamic mutual-
ity of the human-elephant relationship integral to Nepali hattisare practice and the 
interspecies community it produces.
Like the hattisare, I came to understand “my” elephant as a conscious person 
with desires not entirely dissimilar to my own, with whom I could develop a rela-
tionship involving meaningful, two-way communication, and crucially, as a being 
who could reject her human companion if she wished. Indeed, the unwritten social 
contract between human and elephant is typically severed as old age approaches, 
when the elephant chooses to retire itself through increasing absences from the 
stable. This is the time in their life when their final set of molars wear down, after 
which they will no longer be capable of digesting food. I saw this myself with an el-
ephant named Chanchal Kali, an aging, almost blind elephant at the hattisar of the 
Biodiversity Conservation Center in nearby Sauraha, a hub for Chitwan ecotour-
ism. Her absences were accepted with a degree of sadness, since their significance 
as a harbinger of her impending death were understood.
Just as it took me time to appreciate the implication of autonomy in the act 
of reverence when mounting your elephant, so too the language of driving ini-
tially misled me. Although we spoke in terms that seemed to imply a perspective of 
handler-directed control and domination, it was only later that I realized this lin-
guistic framing served to obfuscate what was also understood in terms of dynamic 
mutuality. Again, it was my affective and corporeal experience apprenticing with 
Sitasma that clarified the status of such commentaries. As I began my driving train-
ing, the patient Ram Ekval showed me how to give instructions by applying pres-
sure with my toes behind Sitasma’s ears, that intimate space of sensual contact only 
experienced by an elephant’s driver. With his broad, welcoming grin he explained 
the various vocal commands handlers also use, and how to discipline Sitasma with 
a strike of the stick on her forehead. This instruction seemed to confirm a rela-
tionship of domination, albeit one tempered by the sensual engagement of human 
and elephant bodies familiar with each other. However, we both knew that verbal 
instruction alone would be as sufficient as expecting someone to master riding a 
bicycle without first falling off. Thus, Ram Ekval was bound to let me try for my-
self. More than merely the mechanics of an animate machine to master though, 
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mahouting with Sitasma represented an intersubjective relationship to be engen-
dered. With such an affable temperament, she willingly let herself be driven by an 
inexperienced foreigner whom she had only known for a short time. It was within 
her power not to tolerate me if she did not want to, but gladly, she did. Instruction 
was then but a prelude to embodied and empathetic learning, which not only defies 
verbal exposition but also requires development of an interpersonal relationship 
between handler and elephant (see Gieser 2008).
Sitasma was teaching me, even elephantizing me a little. A wiggle of her head 
would inform me I was misapplying my toes, her insistence on turning left when 
I was trying to turn right during grazing would be revealed not as disobedience 
on her part but rather her way of directing me toward the plant matter she liked 
for food or medicine (on self-medicating practices among elephants see Piyadasa 
1994: 472). I needed to know such things if we were to understand each other. By 
learning to be together we began operating with knowing synergy. The handlers 
confirmed this: of course your elephant teaches you, of course you have to develop 
an empathetic understanding of each other, because “elephants are just like people 
too.” This was a sentiment I heard many handlers express on many occasions, and 
the treatment of elephants as merely servile, animate machines (cf. Ingold 1994: 8) 
was a trope of cautionary tales in which bad handlers get what they deserve. My 
revelations were old news to my human colleagues, but my excited commentaries 
evoked a recognition of shared experience resistant to verbal articulation, of some-
one just beginning to acquire aspects of their hattisare habitus, and hence someone 
who was beginning to experience their lifeworld as members of a shared, interspe-
cies moral community.
This was a lifeworld characterized by the intensive practices of interspecies 
encounter within a multispecies total institution housing a hybrid community of 
humans and elephants, similarly conceived as persons. The patchuwa Bukh Lal, 
who worked with the mighty tusker Birendra Prasad (named after the Nepali King 
killed by his son in the royal palace massacre of 2001, see Baral 2002), revealed the 
totalizing character of life spent with an elephant companion: “I know my own 
elephant better than I know my own family.” This was no surprise since he came 
from a once-forested district in the eastern Tarai, which has traditionally supplied 
recruits to the sarkari hattisar, even though the forests have dwindled and the local 
stables are long gone. His family home was more than a day’s journey away. Bukh 
Lal was with Birendra every day, able to read his moods in ways I could not discern, 
and only reunited with his family a few times a year, during annual leave (bida). 
He could approach Birendra in ways that would be foolish for me to do, as I would 
dramatically learn for myself with a female elephant named Puja Kali, even when 
he was not in musth (mada). This is a periodic state of hormonal excitation that can 
last a few months, during which a male becomes dangerous and unpredictable, his 
urge to procreate visibly evident, negating usual relational bonds of trust between 
handler and elephant. As Bukh Lal said, “At these times, he’s out of control, he’s not 
himself; he can’t be held responsible for his behavior.”
These situations notwithstanding, I was beginning to truly appreciate the pos-
sibilities of knowing intimacy between handler and elephant. The ritualized greet-
ing I described in the vignette that began this article is instructive. Sitasma’s act of 
“hugging” me with her trunk was regular, it was mutually meaningful, and unlike 
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the supplicatory gesture of reverence I have also described, it was a practice she her-
self initiated. Besides the strictly ethological interpretation of this pleasing embrace 
that would suggest Sitasma was recognizing my smell, I was well aware that mak-
ing sense of this encounter raised questions about anthropomorphic interpretation 
and the challenges of understanding interspecies sociality and communication. At 
this time, preceding the emergence of multispecies ethnography, and concerned as 
I was with expert knowledge and practice, I was most interested in how the other 
handlers understood this practice. They claimed they could read their elephant’s 
body language and recognize acts of affection in their behavior toward us. For me, 
it was an affective act of trusting surrender that signified the empathetic connec-
tion we had developed.
The hattisare confirmed my interpretation of these regular and distinctive 
trunk probings as a greeting ritual: this was how some elephants were known to 
engage with human companions with whom they have a sustained, intimate, and 
dependent relationship. As my human colleagues pointed out, this was also a way 
for Sitasma to mark me as “her human” (usko manche). It confirmed the attainment 
of a trusting relationship, since I would be a fool to come into such close proximity 
unless I was confident of her benevolent attitude toward me. After all, an elephant 
can violently discard us like an unwanted toy if they wish. Indeed, I was told of a 
case in which this had happened. Five years before my arrival, Puja Kali, who resid-
ed next to Sitasma, had squashed her handler. Just as Bukh Lal excused Birendra’s 
behavior during musth as “temporary insanity,” this event was not blamed on Puja 
Kali’s temperament but rather on the disrespectful behavior of her handler, who 
had fallen off her back in a drunken state. Significantly, this consensual defense 
of Puja Kali, either irritated or confused by her handler’s irregular behavior, dem-
onstrated that hattisare were willing to defend an elephant companion against a 
human colleague. This was perhaps indicative not only of the abhorrence of irrev-
erence toward these gods in animal form but also of the commensurable valuation 
of human and elephant forms of life in the hybrid moral community of the hattisar.
The entangled loyalties of human and elephant social life were also evident in 
the way that networks of human-elephant relations were determined both by hu-
man-to-human and elephant-to-elephant relations. I catalogued my knowledge of 
the hattisare with respect to the human-elephant teams of which they were a part. 
This influenced the pattern of my interaction with the handlers. Who your ele-
phant was at least partially determined which of your human colleagues you would 
mix with most. If your elephants were grazing friends, you would have greater rea-
son to maintain friendly relations with each other. I was beginning to realize that 
me being “Sitasma’s human” (sitasmako manche) raised more interesting questions 
than Sitasma being “my elephant” (mero hatti).
That greeting ritual between Sitasma and me did not merely confirm that 
trusting rapport had developed between us, it also signified my acquisition of a 
particular identity for her, and also more generally for the whole community of 
Khorsor elephants. Their own patterns of conspecific interactions, inflected by 
personal preferences not entirely dissimilar to those among humans, had great 
significance for their human companions. Understanding how inter-elephant re-
lations articulate with inter-human relations through the coupling patterns that 
connect particular elephants to particular humans was another important aspect 
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of my apprenticeship. This was dramatically illustrated for me one morning when I 
walked close to Sitasma’s neighbor, Puja Kali, known to be an occasionally moody 
elephant. With a rapidity that surprised me, she came out from her tethering post 
and gave me a swift, reprimanding slap with her trunk. I was shocked by her speed, 
power, and accuracy. Wielded by Sitasma, the trunk had come to represent an in-
strument of loving connection, but wielded by Puja Kali, an elephant with whom I 
was not intimate, it represented a weapon of hostility.
Convinced of the potency of the lesson I had learned, an amused colleague 
remarked that in every future elephant encounter I should remember that I was 
marked as Sitasma’s human (and again, this was the fault of my ignorance rather 
than cause to blame Puja Kali’s temperament). It was my responsibility to learn 
that there was a history of hostility between Sitasma and Puja Kali, which would 
make me an enemy of Puja Kali by extension. Similarly, I was warned never to take 
Sitasma close to another female called Lakshmi Kali, since they too had a history of 
antagonism (with Sitasma bearing a scar on her haunch to prove it). The animos-
ity between Sitasma and other elephants had an influence on my interaction with 
members of those elephants’ human care teams. Since our interests diverged, we 
found ourselves likely to interact less.
Thus, through my own intimate, interspecies relationship I came to realize the 
importance of elephant life histories in relation to each other and in relation to 
hattisare. The career biography of a hattisare is intimately bound to that of his ele-
phant, and these histories play a constitutive role in their interwoven social worlds, 
sometimes discrete, sometimes overlapping. In terms of the concerns of ethnoele-
phantology and multispecies studies, this illustrates the humanist problem in pro-
moting a purely human history that denies the constitutive role of other species, to 
which Susan Nance responds with a call for a transspecies history (2013). However, 
the issue here is not just the agency of elephants but also their agency as inten-
tional social beings. My basic familiarity with the philosophical problem of animal 
minds (e.g., Griffin 1984, 2001) meant that I knew I had to be cautious about mak-
ing the apparently anthropomorphic attribution of personhood, unless of course 
I challenged the ontological assumptions upon which it relies (see Ingold 1994). 
In the field, though, circumspection seemed irrelevant, and I was yet to encounter 
Varner’s argument for elephant personhood from the identification of elephants’ 
temporal self-awareness (2008). I cared less about the propriety of scientific think-
ing and the politics of moral reasoning than I did the affective experience of an in-
terspecies relationship with a captive elephant. At this time, it seemed more useful 
to understand the cultural logic by which the hattisare understood their elephants 
as persons of another kind.
Hattisare conceptions of personhood
This then, is what I set about investigating. By considering hattisare conceptions 
of nature, authority, and the logic of caste, their extended attribution of person-
hood beyond the human became intelligible, articulated in a way that emphasizes 
human-animal continuities without denying human-animal differences. Nature, 
as a domain exterior to inhabited dwellings and not ostensibly transformed by 
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human activity (Ellen 1996), was not understood according to the dualistic mo-
dality of Western thought with its tradition of humanist scholarship. Following 
Philippe Descola (1996) and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro (1996), rather than a clear 
separation of the domains of human culture and nonhuman nature, I discerned a 
sociocentric understanding in which nature and society are subject to the same 
organizing logic. The logic in this case was articulated through the idiom of sub-
stance, considered by some as typical of Hindu and South Asian thought (Marriott 
1976; Marriott and Inden 1977).
In a world in which all life shares substance that varies according to the ratio of 
its component qualities, the three humoral guna of satvas, rajas, and tamas, which 
can be transmuted as a result of the effect of action or karma, and which determine 
rebirth in the cycle of life, or samsara, it follows that the ontological boundaries 
between animality, humanity, and divinity are permeable. In previous existences 
we may have lived in animal form, but with the potential for godhood within us 
all, in a future existence we may be able to realize our intrinsically divine nature 
and ascend the hierarchy of being, just as a change of dietary and ritual practice 
has enabled social groups to redefine their place within caste hierarchies based on 
the idiom of ritual purity (Srinivas 1962). As Lawrence Babb remarks, the greeting 
of namaste (like the gesture of supplication upon mounting an elephant) may be 
translated as saluting that portion of god that dwells within you (1975: 52).
In this sociocentric and hierarchic world, the jungle, savannas, and rivers to 
which we daily drove with our elephants are conceived as potentially dangerous 
and unpredictable places, subject however to the rule of deities, most significant of 
which is Ban Devi, the goddess of the forest. By conducting sacrificial rituals, we 
acknowledged her sovereign authority, and appeased her potential wrath through 
the giving of gifts pleasing to her humoral “substance-nature” (alcohol, meat, mon-
ey, feminine items of beautification), and thereby militated against the misfortunes 
she might cause us, such as attack by dangerous animals. Similarly, we performed 
rituals to petition the goodwill of Ganesh, whose “substance-nature” inhabits our 
elephants. Elephant training is a time when such practices are most essential, since 
it is imperative to acknowledge that the elephants we drive are also gods we wor-
ship (by giving sweets appropriate to Ganesh’s “substance-nature,” evident in myths 
about his appetite and his representation with a fat belly). It was understood that we 
had to request his forgiveness as a superior god in animal form being subordinated 
to the purposes of inferior humans.
This simultaneity of animality and divinity in elephants implies both low and 
high status in a hierarchic continuum of beings. Puzzling upon this led me to con-
sider how integral the logic of caste was to the handlers’ hierarchic and sociocentric 
conception of nature and being. The Nepali word for caste, a group of beings shar-
ing the same substance-nature—i.e., guna composition—whose interactions with 
other groups traditionally had to be strategically and ritually mediated according 
to a rationale of purity, is jat, or in Hindi, jati. This word means type, kind, or even 
species (Marriott and Inden 1977; Burghart 1984: 116–18). Thus, I realized that for 
the handlers there was no problem in extending the logic of caste to elephants, it 
being as much an essentialist theory of kinds as a social theory of discrete, ranked 
groups (see Burghart 1978). Indeed, the Sanskrit genre of texts on elephantology, 
known as gaja sastra, which has parallels with oral traditions of practical elephant 
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knowledge, recognizes eight ranked castes of elephant, understood in terms of 
guna composition (Edgerton 1931; Wakankar and Mhaiskar 2006; Locke 2008).
While nonhuman animals without sacred associations provide little incentive to 
transpose the idiom of natural kinds for figuring relations between social groups to 
relations between species, I realized that in the hybrid community of the hattisar, 
elephants provide particular incentive. As the recognized repository of both animal 
and divine substance, the elephant confounds the typical cosmic hierarchy of gods, 
humans, and animals. Hindu gods are understood and represented in anthropo-
morphic terms, and since the elephant is a god in animal form, it discloses a cultur-
al logic by which handlers may think of their elephants as persons. However, these 
kinds of person—gods, humans, or otherwise—conceptually diverge from that of 
the Western tradition of the individual, a difference McKim Marriott attempted to 
convey with his concept of the “dividual” (Sharma 1990: 252). This consideration 
of nonbiotic entities recalls the cosmo-ecological approach of Vinciane Despret 
and Michel Meuret (2016) that includes gods, ancestors, and spirits in multispecies 
accounts of the forms of life that constitute worlds.
Practical experience and animal ethology
Even as my reflections and my inquiries brought this interpretation into focus, I 
knew it was crucial that neither the handlers nor I needed either set of ideas to 
understand the relationships with our elephant companions in terms of intersub-
jective relations. It seemed that irrespective of our culturally conditioned thinking, 
one could not resist recognizing elephant personalities. Practical experience taught 
us they have memories of prior experiences that influence their behavior and dis-
positions, that they can effectively communicate preferences to nonelephants, that 
they possess reasoning and problem-solving ability, and that they demonstrate loy-
alty and affection. To deny this would be a betrayal of the lifeworld of the hattisare 
as persons involved in a process of becoming with their elephant companions (see 
Haraway 2008).
As such, the ascription of personhood not only suggests an idiom of engage-
ment, but also reflects a mode of highly personalized interspecies encounter. I was 
unconcerned, excited even, that it might seem that I was transgressing the injunc-
tion against anthropomorphism characteristic of most twentieth-century animal 
ethology. After all, one of the primary implications of Darwinian evolutionary bi-
ology has been to subvert the Cartesian segregation of humanity from animality, 
as Darwin controversially acknowledged in his 1871 work “The Descent of Man” 
(Willerslev 2007: 114). It is interesting, though, that the need remains to reaffirm 
the ontological insight regarding the evolutionary continuity of life. For example, 
Barbara Noske reminds us that ethological studies of primates, cetaceans, elephants, 
and wolves have proven that qualities usually considered uniquely human, such as 
sociality, intentionality, self-awareness, tool use, and even language, can also be 
found to varying degrees in our nonhuman relatives (1996). In response to the call 
to rethink the prejudice that insists on drawing a definitive line between us and 
them, cultural primatologist Frans de Waal has advanced the notion of “anthro-
podenial” (2000). If anthropomorphism is the overestimation of commonalities 
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between human and nonhuman animals, then “anthropodenial” is the underesti-
mation of such commonalities (Daston and Mitman 2005: 9).
Conclusion
The experience of interspecies apprenticeship I have documented here contributes 
to the ethnographic study of skilled learning while also raising significant ontologi-
cal and methodological questions for anthropology. As a result of the empathetic 
and embodied relationship I developed with Sitasma Kali, I had to adapt my no-
tions of apprenticeship learning, which at that time largely derived from a litera-
ture concerned with acquiring skills in communities of practice (Lave and Wenger 
1991; Lave 1993; Wenger 1998). Rather than understanding mastery of a craft, such 
as Yemeni minaret building (Marchand 2001), Malian masonry (Marchand 2009), 
British furniture making (Marchand 2010), Gujarati ship-building (Simpson 2006), 
or Liberian Tailoring (Lave 1997), my challenge not only included the mastery of 
practical skills but also the development of an intimate working relationship with a 
sentient nonhuman being.
This intensely affective experience was so profoundly transformative that I was 
compelled to extend personhood itself: my apprenticeship became an endeavor 
in learning how to interact with a nonhuman intersubjectively, and to do so with 
communicative and empathetic efficacy. In embracing for myself the notion that 
elephants are like people too, through lived experience rather than philosophically 
reasoned conviction, as well as encountering hattisare make the same assertion, the 
question arises how to make anthropological sense of a challenge to key ontologi-
cal assumptions about human uniqueness. Here, recent developments in the ani-
mal cognitive and behavioral sciences became theoretically relevant for analyzing 
the data of my field experience, providing support for insights gained from experi-
ences of living and traveling with captive elephants in the streets, stables, jungles, 
and rivers of Chitwan. However, unlike the indigenous traditions of South Asian 
elephant knowledge and their literary codifications (Olivelle 2016), these were sci-
entific traditions that had been initially configured to downplay continuities with 
humans.
On the other side of the divide between the natural and social sciences, by chal-
lenging the typical isomorphism of humanity and personhood, this account also 
reveals the epistemological limitations of Enlightenment Humanism to which 
modern ethnographic practice is intellectually indebted. As a methodology within 
the social sciences, ethnography has developed as a way to study human social 
life that, until recently, critics have found inadequate for incorporating nonhuman 
life. However, posthumanist scholarship critiques the ontological dualisms that op-
pose cultural humans to natural animals, posing key questions about the knowl-
edge practices that constitute the disciplinary configuration of Western thought 
responsible for the divergence of the social and natural sciences. As a consequence, 
new syntheses are emerging that reveal the intersecting relevance of ethnology and 
ethology (Lestel 2006), friction between the domains of the social and the natural 
sciences (Lestel, Bussolini, and Chrulew 2014), and that extend anthropology by 
insisting that the entanglement of other life forms with human lives, landscapes, 
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and technologies must be theoretically integrated into accounts of human existence 
(Kirksey and Helmreich 2010; Ingold 2013).
These new syntheses, the critical interrogation of ontological dualisms, the 
complementary analytic role of cultural ethology, and my transformative expe-
rience becoming a hattisare with Sitasma Kali, have all contributed to the devel-
opment of ethnoelephantology: a new, interdisciplinary framework for studying 
human-elephant intersections. In anthropology, geography, and history, research is 
emerging that explores “the intersecting lifeworlds and environmental mutualities 
of human and elephant” (Locke 2013: 90). This includes, for example, elephants 
as agents in the constitution of transnational environmentalist networks, and in 
the shaping of local landscapes of wildlife conflict in Yunnan (Hathaway 2013: 
152–84); the ambivalent intimacies of human-elephant collaboration in South 
Indian forest management (Münster 2016); elephants, alcohol, psychosocial suf-
fering, and bureaucracy in Assam (Jadhav and Barua 2012); and elephant agency 
in the nineteenth-century American circus (Nance 2013). By demonstrating the 
shared, interspecies moral community that emerges from humans and elephants 
living and working together, this article suggests a need to rethink human-elephant 
relations in a way that recognizes their mutual agency as social actors as well as the 
possibility of treating nonhumans as research informants.
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La personne de l’éléphant; apprentissage affectif et terrain avec des 
informateurs non-humains au Népal
Résumé : Dans ce rapport sur l’intimité inter-espèces dans une étable pour élé-
phants au Népal, j’explore non seulement les figurations humaines de la personne 
mais soutient l’idée d’une inclusion méthodologique des informateurs non-hu-
mains, en tant qu’acteurs dotés d’une subjectivité et en tant que participants dans la 
recherche ethnographique. J’explique comment mon expérience d’une relation de 
confiance avec une éléphante dans une communauté hybride d’humains et d’élé-
phants éclaira pour moi les limites conceptuelles de la focale humano-centrique de 
l’ethnographie et de son inadaptation pour étudier la socialité des rencontres inter-
espèces. Afin de discuter la question de personne non-humaine, je présente les 
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développements des études du comportement animal, tout en étudiant les logiques 
culturelles de l’attribution de personnalité aux éléphants par les mahouts népalais. 
Cette exploration de l’apprentissage, de la personne, de la rencontre affective, se 
situe dans la veine inter-espèces des études multi-espèces; il s’agit d’une contribu-
tion à l’ethno-éléphantologie, une approche interdisciplinaire des relations sociales, 
historiques et écologiques entre les hommes et les éléphants.
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